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CITY OF SAN DIEGO V. SUPERIOR OOURT 
r36 C.2d 483: 124 P.2d 6851 
[L. A. No. 21653. In Bank. Dec. 15, 1950. J 
4~3 
TilE CITY OF SAN DIEGO, Petitioner, v THE SUPERIOR 
COlTRT OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY f't al.. Respondents. 
(1) Prohibition-Adequacy of Other Remedies-When Appeal In-
adequate.-A remedy by appeal froU! the judgment at the end 
of II trial is not such a plain, speedy and ad(>quate rellledy in 
th(> ordinary course of law as will preclude issuance of a writ 
of prohibition, where the court hae. no jurisdictiou to proceed 
with the action. and no appeal IF available before final judg-
ment. 
(2] Appeal-Orders Appealable-Special Orders After Final Judg-
ment.-An order amending an ordel vacating a default judg. 
ment by striking a provision in the vacating order for deter-
mining the valut' of condt'mnea property is not appealablt' as 
a special Older after final judgment, since there is no longer 
8ny such jUdgment in the action, and the amendin~ order does 
not affect the default judgment .but mert'ly recognizes its 
"lIc8tion. 
lS) Eminent Domain-Judgment and Oraer-Modi1ication.-lD a 
cClndemulltion proceeding, BD order fixing a date for the deter-
mination of the property's value is Dot merely a procf'durnl 
order made during th(> course of the proceeding such til> the 
court may modify at any time before judgment, wher(> it 101 
an int~gral part of an order vacating a default judgment under 
Code Civ. Proc., § 473, specifying thE' terms on which such 
relief is granted. 
(4] Id.-Judgment and Order-Modification.-In a cond(>mnation 
proceeding in which a default judgment has been l'nterl'd, 
the court exercises its judicial diserE'tion, after a full henrin)!, 
in including in an order vacating such judl!ment a provi!'<ion 
that the damages be determined as of thE' date summons was 
issued, and any error occurring in thl' exercise of such dis-
cretion may not be corrected except by appeal. 
[5] Prohibition-Grounds for Relief-Want of Jurisdiction.-A!l-
suming that prohibition will not lie to revie," a eompJ(>tI'd 
judicial BCt, if it comprises a void ord(>r, the writ will issue 
to restrain further judicial action based on !'lllch Clrd(>r. 
[1] See 21 Cal.Jur. 588; 42 Am.Jur. 144. 
[2] See 2 Cal.Jur. 150. 2 Am.JUl. 90il. 
Mr.K. Dig. References: [1] Prohihition, ~ 14(2}. f21 ApPl'Blllnd 
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PROCEEDING in prohibition to restrain the 
. Court of San Diego County and Robert B. Burch, 88 
thereof, from proceeding with a trial in a certain 
Writ granted. 
J. F. DuPaul, City Attorney, Douglas D. 
Thomas J. Fanning, Deputy City Attorneys, for 
Warren E. Libby and Harry A. Chamberlin for 
ents and Real Parties in Interest. 
TRA YNOR, J .-The city of San Diego seeks a 
prohibition to restrain the superior court from 
with the trial of a condemnation action pursuant to an 
vacating part of an earlier order. The case is presented . 
demurrer by two of the defendants in the condemnation 
as real parties in interest, who are hereinafter referred 
respondents. 
On Decembl'r 14, 1945. the city brought an action to 
demn cprtain land needed in the development of 
Bay Park in the Mission Bay area of the city. 
oWDpd realty included among the large number 
,involved. Summons on the complaint was issued on J.I~'CCj:UU1 
. 14. 1945. and served on respondents on July 31, 1946. 
was entered against them on December 12. 1946. and 
judgment was entered on December 13, 1946. It was 
that the value of the property was $18.000 on December 
1945. and petitioner deposited this amount in court. . 
On May 9. 1947. respondents filed notice of a motion to 
aside the default and judgment on the grounds that 
were entered "prematurely and without authority of 
and "through the mistake, inadvertence, surprise, and 
cusabJe neglect of defendants." Before and during the '-_ .. M'· .... 
ing on the motion to vacate the ;judgment, the city 
to stipulate that the judgment be vacated and reElpond~en~tB 
allowed a trial on the issue of necessity. if the order 
contained a provision that the damages be determined _ 
December 14. 1945. the date the summons was issued. 
OffPT was basen on sections 473 and 1249 of the Code of 
Procedure. Under spction 473. "The court may, "pon 
terms as may be .iust. relieve a party or his legal 1'PTIl"PJQPntlltive 
from 8 judgment, order. or other proceeding taken agI!iUlR":~ 
him through his mistake, inadvertence. surprise or excusabl~ 
neglect." (Italics added.) Section 1249 provides: "For the 
) 
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pllrJlollt' of assessing compensation and damages the right 
t1l1'rl'of shall be deemed t.o have accrued at the date of the 
1111'1111111'" of summons and its actual value at that date shall 
hi. thl' measure of compensation for all property to be taken, 
, , provided, that in any case in which the issue is not tried 
within olle year after the date of the commencement of the 
.1" iOIl, unlrss the delay is caused by the defendant, the com-
JI"lIsRtion and damages shall be deemed to have accrued at 
Ih.· dllt!' of the trial. .. ," By the offer to stipulate the 
rity ~()lIght to preserve its right to have the damages assessed 
a. .. of tht' datr of the issuance of summons. Respondents ap-
flllrl'ntly rrfnsed so to stipulate, since there was a full hearing 
1111.' argument on the motion to vacate. On May 26, 1947. 
aft.·r that hearing, an order vacating the default and judgment 
was I'nterrd. The order also provided: "It is further ordered 
thllt th!' market value and damages [of this land], upon the 
trilll of said action. shall be determined and fixed as of De-
l't'lIlber 14, 1945." 
Nl'arly three years later, on March 6, 1950, respondents 
fllt'd notice of a motion to amend the order vacating the judg-
nwnt by striking the part settling the date at which the 
prQprrty was to be valued, on the ground that this part of 
tlu:,'ordpr "was and is erroneou~, contrary to law, .and.beyl;t@ __ 
thl' power of the conrt. ,. The motion was denied by the 
jlldg~ who made the original order without prejudice to its 
rrlwwal at the time of trial. The motion was renewed'at 
that time before another judge who, after a hearing, granted 
it on March 28, 1950. Petitioner now seeks a writ of pro-
hibition to preveilt the trial court from proceeding to try 
th .. action on a theory of damages other than that established 
by the original order relieving respondents from default. 
[1] The writ of prohibition will not issue when there is 
a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course 
of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1103.) It is settled, however, 
that the remedy in the ordinary course of law by an appeal 
from the judgment at the end of the trial is not aliequate 
When the court has no jurisdiction to proceed with the aetlOn 
and no appeal is available before final judgment. (Tomales 
Bf1l1 etc. Corp. v. Superior Court, 35 Ca1.2d 389, 392 [217 
P.2d 9681.) It is necessary to determine therefore whether 
the city could have appealed from the order modifying the 
ordrr vaE'l1ting the default judgment. and if not. whether the 
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action on a theory of damages other than that spe:cltied; 
the first order. 
[2] The default judgment was vacated by the 
May 26, 1947. and accordingly, since there was no 
any final judgment in the action the order of March 28. 1 
was not appealablp as a spt'cial order after final 
(Sharp v. Miller, 66 Cal. 98 [4 P. 10651; ct. Schubert v. 
30 CaJ.2d 785. 788-789 [185 P.2d 793].) It could be l"Pv;ipWfI 
by appeal only on an appeal from the subsequent 
judgment. Moreover. to be appealable as a special 
made after final judgment within the meaning of section 
of the Code of Civil Procedure. an order must affect 
judgment in some way. (Williams v. Superior COttrt. l4 
2d 656. 666 [96 P .2d 3341.) The order of March 28. 
did not affect the default judgment but accepted its Vii\::iiU.~AI;:i" 
three years earlier. 
[3] Respondents contend that the order fixing the 
8S of which damages should be measured was merely 8 
cedural ruling made during the course of the action 
that therefore the court had jurisdiction to modify it at 
time before final judgment. (See, City of Los A ngelea . 
Oliver, 102 Cal.App. 299, 325-326 [283 P. 298] ; De la Hef,:.It.: .WUll .... 
v. Superior Court, 146 Cal. 496, 499 [80 P. 717]; Barth 
Ten Eyck, 16 Ca1.2d 829. 833 {l08 P.2d 675).) In the nrellen' 
case, however, the order fixing the date as of which 
would be assessed was not merely a procedural order 
during the course of the trial: it was an integral part of 
order vacating a judgment under section 473 of the 
of Civil Procedure specifying the terms upon which 
relief would be granted. 
[4] The order settled a major issue between the 
namely, the basis on which the valup of the n?(\npl'TV 
be determined. Respondents had moved to vacate the 
judgment, and the trial court. in an exercise of its dislcre1t10Jl 
relieved respondents of default as to the issue of the n1'(\npjpt111ta 
of the taking, but in effect held that because of the 
caused by respondents the city was entitled, under 
1249 of the Code of Civil Procedure to obtain the land at 
value at the date of the issuance of summons. The 
decision was arrived at after considering the conflicting "."'·~,l,JlI 
in the affidavits and counteraffidavits of the parties, its 
to limit the issues of a trial granted under section 4 
the provisions of section 1249 as to the date of 
The part of the order limiting the issues of the trial was 
) 
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fx('rcise of judicial discretion and was not entered by lD-
ad\'ertence or clerical error. U respondents w~re dissatisfipd 
with the refusal of the court unconditioually to vacate the 
dl·fllult judgment. their remedy was by appeal from that 
(ml!'r (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 938. 963; Cuan v. S11perlOr Cour'. 
]4 ('nl.2d 591 [95 P.2d 931) ; see, AJa:rwll llordware Co v. 
Fo.,ttr. 207 Cal. 167, 170 [277 P. 3271) but they did not 
8\'oil themselves of it. [n fact they raisf'd no obje('tion for 
nl'arly three years. and then attack('d only a part of tbe 
order solely on the ground that it was legall~' erroneous. 
This was an attempt to correct a claimed judicial error The 
ft'('ord is clear that the city did oot COOSf'nt to tbe modifit'a-
tion (Cf., Phelan v Superwr Oourt. 35 Cal.2d 363. 373 
1217 P.2d 951).) 
"I J 1 udicial error which occurs in the rendition of orders 
or judgment!' which are tht' fault of an exercise of judicial 
(lis('retion may not be corr('('ted px('ep1 by statutory pro-
(,I'dnre." as foT' pxamplt'. nnder seetlOns 473 and 663 of the 
Codp of Civil Procedurp (Phill,ps v. Tr1Mhetm, 25 Cal.2d 913. 
!116 f156 P.2d 251 . Barlou' v. Oity Council of Inglewood, 32 
Cal.2d 688 [197 P .2d 7211; Bastaj1an v. Brown. 19 Ca1.2d 
20!l1120 P.2d 9) ; Mo.~t Worshtpful Lodge v.Sons etc. Lodge, 
91 Cal.App.2d 582 (2b5 P.2d 722].) "The decisions of this 
{'ourt are numerous and uniform to the effect that a judgment 
or order OOCf' regularly ~ntered can be reviewed and set aside 
only in the modes prescribed byt;tatute. [S Jubject to 
th('se exceptions (inadvertence and clerical error I the order 
is reviewable only on appeal. and the decision of the trial 
court having been once made after regular submission of the 
motion its power is exhausted-it is funct1l., officio. r Cita-
tions.]" (Holtum 'V. Grief. '.44 Cal. 521, 524-525 (78 P. 11J; 
Bowman v. Bowman. 29 Ca1.2d 808, 813-814 \178 P.2d 751. 
170 A.L.R. 2461.) 
{5] Respondents contend. however, that even if the order 
of 1950 is void. it is a completed judicial a('t and therefore 
prohibition will not lie to review its validity. (See, Big bm 
Jlines v. Superior Oourt. 9 Ca1.2d 503. 504 [71 P.2d 67); 
State Bd. of Equaltzation 'V. Superior Oourt. 9 Cal.2d 252, 254 
f70 P.2d 482].) '1;'he writ is not sought. however. to review 
th~t order but to prevent the trial court from proceeding to 
trial Upon all issues despite the express limitation in the origi-
nal order that one of the main isslles was settled and was not to 
be further litigated. Since it is further judicial action based 
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upon a void order that petitioner seeks to restrain, nrc)hililli 
is a proper remedy. (Hunter v. Superior Court, 36 "' .......... , ... 
100, 110 [97 P.2d 492] ; Stevens v. Superior Court, 7, 
110 [59 P.2d 988].) 
Let the peremptory writ issuE' aR prayed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., ilud Spence, J., 
currt'd. 
CAH1'EH, J.-I dissent. 
The majority opmion is based on thE' following 
The order vacating the judgment. entered pursuant 
motion made under section 473 of the Code of Civil J.> .. ,n..~A. 
which contained a provision fixing the time for iI"'~"'P1mi" 
the value of the property, could not be vacated or 
-that is, the court lacked jurisdiction to do so. Th" .... """ 
the order striking out such provision was void. Being 
the trial court had no jurisdiction to proceed with the 
of the' case in reliance upon saio void order. Hence PJ"II}DIUJ'lI1III 
tion.-a jurisdictional writ. was proper; that the court 
no jurisdiction other than to follow the provision fixing 
for determining value in the vacatinl! order. That l'P.RrJlnllm 
is squarely contrary to Phelan v. 81lperior Court, 35 
363 [217 P.2d 951], where the trial ('ourtin its order 
Ii motion for a new trial ordered the judgment reduced· 
amount. This is similar to the provision fixing time 
dett'rminiug value in the vacating' order in the instant 
This court after stating in the Phplan ease that WflWU.1UU 
is not available until 8 request is made to the trial court 
correet its error, said ~ ''In the preRent case petitioner 
have made a motion under FIe-dian 473 of the Code of 
Procedure to vacate the- portion of th.e order claimed ·'0 
invalid. Instead of making such motion petitioner .... AUf!(U 
until after the time for appeal had passed and then 
. this application fOT writ of mandate. without ever L __ '-:_'0.":; 
presented the matteT to the trial court. There is no ShOWmg. ,il 
that the question was raised in any manner before the trial., 
court or that it would have been futile to do so. ,. (Emphasis.! 
added.) (Phelan v. Superior Oourt. 35 Cal.2d 363. 372 f211j 
P.2d 951J.) If the claimed invalid part of the orde-r could,[ 
there be eliminated by the trial conrt. it had jurisdiction tol 
do so. There. as here. the trial court had .iurisdiction under: 
section 473 to consider the que!;;tion of whether the provisioDj 
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wrtion of the vacating order, should be eliminated. Having 
jurisdiction, its order striking out such invalid provision was 
not void, and constituted nothing more than error made in 
thl' exercise of its jurisdiction. 
'It bas been repeatedly held that a trial court bas jurisdiction 
to vacat.e or modify a previous order made by it, even though 
thr prior order is fina1 and appea1able. (Harth v. Ten Eyck, 
]6 Ca1.2d 829 [l08 P.2d 675); De 1.0 Beckwith v. 8uperior 
Court, 146 Cal. 496 [80 P. 717]; Imperial Beverage Co. v. 
Superior Coort, 24 Cal.2d 627 [150 P.2d 881] ; Key 8ystem 
Trann' Unes v. 8uperior Court. ante, p. 184 [222 P.2d 
8671; People v. Eggers, SO Cal.2d 676 (185 P.2d 1].) For 
illustration it is said in the Imperia) Beverage Co. ease (p. 
634): "It is fUrther contended that the order denying the 
flrst motion for a stay is res judicata as to the subsequent 
motion. While the plea of res judicata may be a good defense 
to an action in which it is interposed, it does not deprive the 
court· of jurisdiction over the action nor does it deprive the t 
court of jurisdiction to pass upon and decide a motion after 
it has previously dpcided a like motion. Its action upon the 
5('cond motion may be erroneous, but it is not in excess of 
JurisdIction. (Harth v. Ten Eyck, 16 Ca1.2d 829, 882 UOS 
'·.2d 6751.)" If a court can hear and determine a motion 
. where the identicaJ motion 'was previously made and deni.,(t 
by a finaJ order. it certainly bas jurisdiC'tion to bear and 
determine a motion to modify the first order. In the Key 
Systt'm case, supra. 8 motion to dismiss an action for failure 
to prosecute was granted. Thereafter. onplaiutift"s motion, 
an order was made vacating the order of dismissal. The 
Rame grounds existed in each ease before the first motion. 
In denying prohibition, which was sought to prevent the court 
rrom proceeding with the trial, because the court lacked juris-
diction to makt' the second order, two members of this court 
Raid(p. 186): "The arguments of the petitioner invoke 
applieation 'of the policy requiring finality of judgments and 
orders. That policy generally controls where a judgment or 
order is entered after a trial on the merits of the litigatIon. 
. But the policy has not been deemed controlling wht're 
the judgment or order set aside was in the exercise of a dis-
cretionary power not based on the merits of the &etlon. . . • 
In giving effect to that policy appellate courts have generally 
refrained from int~rferinf! on jurilld;rfinnnl 21"ol1D1iR with thf> 
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on tIle filer-ii:; of 'ht IIIlgfltwn. (Sc(', Kenney v. Kelleher, 
Cal. 442; 0(, 10 Bt'cku"'" Y. Superlor Coltrt, 146 Cat 496 
P. 717J; Glullgle v. ~I/IJ"r/(Jr Court,169 Cal. 675 [147 P. 
Barth. v Tetl Eyck, 16 Ca1.2d 829 [108 P.2d 675]; MCllI,na.lIIl1 
v Silvery, 6 Cal.2d 629, 631 l59 P.2d 98j: Wathns v. 
Cartney, 70 Cal.App. 137 1232 P. 982].)" (EmphasIs ..... '." .... '1511 
The eourt said in Pt'ople v. Eggers, wpra, 692: "8cc~tioi1i',l 
1026 of the Penal Code authorizes a separate trial upon 
is!luE' of insanity and specifically authorizes the court, in 
cllscrE'tion, to retalD or dismiss the jury which tried the 
al'lion The directIOn to retain the first Jury is deDomi 
, all order (Code Civ. Proc .. § tOoa \ and every court has o'n ......... 
ttl amend and control its orders so as to make them eOllltfllrmlAbl1l! 
til law and justIce. \ Code eiv Proe .. § 128. subd 8.) 
qll~stionably. the trial court was lDvest('d with j 
to make an order retaining the jury, and it must be COlIt!PI1ed 
that it has iun~dlrt'u11 to modify, revoke, or set its ,..,I .... j'~ 
u .. ~lde. (lmpenal Betteroge Co. v. Superior Court, 24 
627 (150 P.2d 881 J ; Harth v. 7'en Eyck, 16 Ca1.2d 829 r 
P.2d 675]; De la Beckwith v. Supertor Court, 146 Cal. 
180 P. 717] ; BUf'bank v. Oontinental Life Ins. 00.,2 "' .. """"It'I' ...... 
2d 664 [38 P.2d 451J; Struck v. Superior Court, 138 ~~~~~ 
·6i2 [32 P.2d 1110] ; City 0/ Los Angeles' v."Oliver, 
App.299 1283 P. 298j.) The rule stated in .De Za Rl!l!kwtfl&"{I 
'Y. 8upenor Court, wpra (p. 499), is as follows: ~lt 
common occurrence for a trial court to change its 
during the progress of a trial. upon questions of law, and 
one would contend that it is not within its po\vcr to do .. 
or that it should Dot do 80 when satisfied that the forme;-
ruling was erroneous.''' (Emphasis added.) It is true there. 
are some cases to the contrary (see Phillip. v. Trftesheim, 
Cal.2d 913 [156 P.2d 25J) but. there are more in accord 
the view of the eases cited above. 
Furthermore, it should be pointed out that the motion to 
strike the proviSIon fixing time for determining value in the : 
vacating order was based on thp ground that it was erroneOus 
and was beyond the power of the court to make. The order 
granting the motion mentlons no ground. It must be p~ 
sumed, th~r~fore, that it was made under sect~on473 o! the) 
Code of Clvtl Procedure, on the ground that It was VOid OD' 
its race. (See concurring opmion of Gibson. C. J., and: 
Schaller, J. in Key SY!ltem TranRit Line. v. 8u.perior CO'IIrl,i 
Ill/pm. Phc1anv. S"pprwr Cnurt. Rupra.) fr thp provision: 
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nlll void the result is not different for the eourt had statutory' 
jurisdiction (Code Civ. Proc., 9 473) to determine whether 
it was void. 
In reality the provision fixing time for. determining value 
ill litl' vacating order was nothing more than 8 procedural 
IIlt'l' ill the process of the trial of the eminent domain pro-
('I.t·dillg. By it the court merely made an order by which 
till' law luI' the triaZ was stated. If it bad made a ruling at 
tll;' op~lIing of the trial that the value of the property would 
ht' d .. termined as of a eertain date, prohibition would not lie 
to prt'vcnt the court from proceeding with the trial. If, when 
f'viill'nce was offered as to the value of the property at a 
part icular time, and objection was made, the ruling on that 
ubjt'ction, right or wrong, would not have authorized prohi-
hit inn to prevent the court from proceeding further with the 
trilli. It is said in Johnston v. Super~or Court, 4 Cal.App. 90, 
... 11:1 187 P. 211]: "The court baving jurisdiction to make the 
rulings, the fact that it may have ruled erroneously does not 
ou!'!t it of jurisdiction. Such errors can be reviewed at the 
Slillle time and in the same manner as ordinary errors in 
urdinary cases, and the fact that petitioner ejected to ba!'!e 
",h'!l'~bjections . ..oa.ju.risdil!!Jo!l8:1 grounds cannot change the 
. wl'lI-settled rule regulating the review-~iid 'correction of errors 
of lnw occurring during the course of a trial. The writ of 
prohibition will not . be issued' except in case.s of extreme 
n('cessity, and it certainly cannot be used for the purpose of 
regUlating the issues in a pending cause and confining them 
to a particular scope, or to test the correctness of ruling!; on 
motions to strike out the whole or any part of a pleading 
filed in a cause over which the court has complete and un-
questioned jurisdiction. To tolerate such a practice would 
be subversive of the purpose of the writ which is to reRtrain 
inferior tribunals and bodies from inflicting wrong under tbe 
guise of jurisdiction or authority wbich bas no potential exist-
ence. It would invite intolerable delay and annoyance in 
every case where a jurisdictional question might percbance . 
be incidentally involved, and make this prerogative writ the 1 
medium through which appellate courts could exercise super-
visory control over inferior tribunals acting within the scope 
of their legitimate powers." 
The Superior Court of San Diego County nnquestionably 
has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of 
the action here involved. Having such jurisdiction, it bKS 
/ 
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po~er and authority to proceE.'d and dispose of the cas'e-nea 
and determine the issues-even thougb it may do 80 
neously. If the holding in the majority opinion is 
that the court is without jurisdiction to proceed with the 
. of this case because it struck out the provision in the owl..,;. 
vacating the judgment tixing the time for determining 
value of the propErty. then. if this writ had not been .U~II(Qlij_. 
and the case bad proceeded to judgment; the judgmt'nt 
be void and subject to collateral attack. There can· 
escape from this conclusion, because, if there is any .... Yu .... -"'I 
law in this country, it is, that in order for a court to 
a valid judgment, it must have jurisdiction to hear and oeter-_.J,I 
mine the cause. (7 Cal.Jur. 594; 8 Oal.Jur. 858; 15 
52; 31 Am.Jur., Judgments, §406.) The majority say, 
effect, that the court bas no jurisdiction to permit the 
to introduce evidence as to the value of the property 
time other than the date on wbich summons was 
Would the majority have beld tbe same way if the nl'fl,vUrioDC''i 
tixing time for determining value had not bet'n atrieklm 
ttl' order vacating the judgment, but the trial judge 
disregardt'd such provision and allowed evidence of value 
.. «?tth_e_ dllte,of the trial without so ad.vising counsel 
the_ trial' Would tht' majority grant a writ of ___ .1.:1..:60"_ 
and interrupt the trial or hold the judgment void and 
to collateral attack if no such writ wer~ sougbt during 
trial but certiorari was sought after the time for appeal 
expired' If these questions are answered in the 
the majority will usher in a new era in the use of prerogative.. 
writs heretofore unheard of or even imagined, and the arduon. 
labors of the Chief Justice in attempting to clarify tbe law 
on this subject will be dissipated and come to naught. (~. 
Phelan v. Superior Court, 35 Cal.2d 868 {217 P.2d 951 . 
Robinson v. Superior Court, 35 CaUd 879 {218 P.2d 
Tomales 'Bay etc. Corp. v. Superior Court, 35 Ca1.2d 
[217 P.2d 968].) 
I would deny the writ of prohibition sought in this case. 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
Respondent's and Real PaTties' in Interest petition for:' .. ' 
rehearing was denied January 11, 1951, Carter, J., and·. 
Schauer, J" voted for a rehearing • 
.. '-~ 
